A-RDP79M00467A002500160015-27/6 Approved For Release 2004/10/2

Executive Registry 25X1

DCI/IC 76-001

1 5 JAN 1976

The Honorable Robert F. Ellsworth Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Bob:

A Secretary of Defense memorandum of 10 November 1975 requests my views on the desirability of expanding the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) concept to make the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) a national focal point for crisis management support.

The National Security Council has established the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) as the vehicle for coordinated policy making. I believe it is essential that the tasking of our intelligence structure originate from that level to ensure that the Intelligence Community operates as a coordinated whole, rather than as a series of parts.

Certainly, a critical feature of the kinds of crisis situations which we are most likely to face in the future is the necessity that intelligence -- military, political and even economic-cover all facets of the crisis. And, in any crisis there are several sets of intelligence consumers, all trying quickly to define and emphasize their particular requirements. I recognize that this kind of problem exists to a degree within the competing sets of military intelligence requirements, especially in a crisis situation. In my view, DoD's approach to use the CCF to prioritize and validate time-sensitive military requirements in one centrally directed establishment makes a great deal of sense, although I am still not quite sure this arrangement provides the full answer to the problem of rationalizing time-critical national requirements.

In this connection, it is my understanding that the total DoD interface with the CCF has not been structured. I'm informed that the CCF will primarily serve the timesensitive requirements of NMIC and the U&S Commands, with

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DCI/IC 76-001

NSA and the military service organizations not using it on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the CCF will apparently have the capacity to service the time-sensitive requirements of these organizations and non-DoD users as well.

I am directing the Intelligence Community Staff to review the CCF concept in detail, considering it in terms of the specialized requirements of Community members, and developing ideas for making it a key and integrated part of the national crisis management support mechanism.

This preliminary review is expected to be completed by early March 1976 and will be made available promptly.

Sincerely,

Vs/ Bill

W. E. Colby

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#### THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

ICS 76-001

The Honorable William P. Clements, Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Bill:

Your memorandum of 10 November 1975 requests my views on the desirability of expanding the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) concept to make the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) a national focal point for crisis management support.

The National Security Council has established the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) as the vehicle for coordinated policy making. I believe it is essential that the tasking of our intelligence structure originate from that level to ensure that the Intelligence Community operates as a coordinated whole, rather than as a series of parts.

Certainly, a critical feature of the kinds of crisis situations which we are most likely to face in the future is the necessity that intelligence-military, political and even economic--cover all facets of the crisis. And, in any crisis there are several sets of intelligence consumers, all trying quickly to define and emphasize their particular requirements. I recognize that this kind of problem exists to a degree within the competing sets of military intelligence requirements, especially in a crisis situation. In my view, DoD's approach to use the CCF to prioritize and validate time-sensitive military requirements in one centrally-directed establishment makes a great deal of sense, although I am still not quite sure this arrangement provides the full answer to the problem of rationalizing time critical national requirements.

In this connection, it is my understanding that the total DoD interface with the CCF has not been structured. I'm informed that the CCF will primarily serve the time-sensitive requirements of NMIC and the U&S

Commands, with NSA and the military service organizations not using it on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the CCF will apparently have the capacity to service the time-sensitive requirements of these organizations and non-DoD users as well.

I am directing the Intelligence Community Staff to review the CCF concept in detail, considering it in terms of the specialized requirements of Community members, and developing ideas for making it a key and integrated part of the national crisis management support mechanism.

This preliminary review is expected to be completed by early March 1976. Upon its completion, I will inform you of my initial views.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

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ICS 76-001

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### Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP79M00467A002500160015-2 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

The Honorable William P. Clements, Jr Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Bill:

Your memorandum of 10 November 1975 requests my views on the desirability of expanding the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) concept to make the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) a national focal point for crisis management support.

The National Security Council has established the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) as the vehicle for coordinated policy making. I believe it is essential that the tasking of our intelligence structure originate from that level to ensure that the Intelligence Community operates as a coordinated whole, rather than as a series of parts.

Certainly, a critical feature of the kinds of crisis situations which we are most likely to face in the future is the necessity that intelligence—military, political and even economic—cover all facets of the crisis. And, in any crisis there are several sets of intelligence consumers, all trying to quickly define and emphasize their particular requirements. Of course this brings about the necessity to prioritize and validate these several requirements in one centrally directed establishment. DoD's approach to this problem, within NMIC, is a very positive step in that direction.

It is my understanding that the total DoD interface with the CCF has not been structured. I'm informed that the CCF will primarily serve the time-sensitive requirements of NMIC and the U&S Commands, with NSA and the military service organizations not using it on a regular basis. Nevertheless,

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the CCF will apparently have the capacity to service the time-sensitive requirements of these organizations and non-DoD users as well.

I am directing the Intelligence Community Staff to review the CCF concept in detail, considering it in terms of the specialized requirements of Community members, and developing ideas for making it either the focal point or an integrated part of the national crisis management support mechanism.

This preliminary review is expected to be completed in the rearry, 1976. Upon its completion, I will inform you of my initial views.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Response to Deputy Secretary of

Defense Memorandum on Collection

Coordination Facility

1. The attached letter is in response to Mr. Clements memorandum of 10 November requesting your views on the desirability of expanding the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) within the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) to make the NMIC a national focal point for crisis management support.

- 2. I believe we should approach this problem in three phases. The first is to respond with the attached memorandum which acknowledges the letter, points out that in a crisis situation there are several types of intelligence information and a number of consumers to be served, the CCF is a positive step for DOD and that a more detailed review is underway.
  - 3. The second phase will consist of a detailed review of the NMIC and CCF and development of a plan to review the crisis management problem in detail and identify several alternative roles of how the CCF could be part of, or the focal point of a national crisis management system.
  - 4. The third phase would be the implementation of the plan developed above.

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry

The Honorable William P. Clements, Jr. Deputy Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Bill:

Your memorandum of 10 November 1975 requests my views on the desirability of expanding the Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) concept to make the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) a national focal point for crisis management support.

A critical feature of the kinds of crisis situations which we are most likely to face in the future is the necessity that intelligence-military, political and even economic--cover all facets of the crisis. In a crisis there are several sets of intelligence consumers and any government entity should attempt to define and categorize its priorities. DoD's focusing of its requirements within the NMIC is a very positive step in that direction.

I have asked the Intelligence Community Staff to review in detail the CCF concept and develop some ideas of how the CCF could be part of, or the focal point of, national crisis management support. This preliminary review should be completed in January 1976. At that time I will inform you of our initial conclusion.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

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